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Educational Malpractice: Given the National
Goals for Education, are Courts Prepared to
Recognize this Cause of Action?
A meeting between President Bush and the Governors resulted in the establishment of six national goals
for education. These national goals encouraged giving
educators increased responsibility and flexibility. This
Note asserts that while the courts' role in fostering educational changes is unclear, it should not include recognition of the tort of "educational malpractice." Judicial
recognition of "educational malpractice" is surrounded by
competing policy decisions along with a wide range of
potentially adverse consequences. The National Goals for
Education, while setting forth a plan for rehabilitating
our public school system, have not provided the courts the
necessary guidelines to satisfactorily adjudicate an action
for inadequate education.
I. INTRODUCTION

Education has increasingly become the focus of national
attention. At an historical education summit (Education Summit) held in Charlottesville, Virginia in October of 1989, President Bush and attending state governors established six national goals designed to make the United States more competitive internationally. 1 The President and the governors at the

1.
National Goals for Education, Press Release from Executive Office of the
President, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 26, 1990) [hereinafter National Goals for Educa·
tion]. The goals are as follows:
(1) All children in America will start school ready to learn; (2) The
high school graduation rate will increase to at least 90 percent; (3)
American students will leave grades 4, 8, and 12 having demonstrated
competency in challenging subject matter including English, mathematics,
science, history, and geography; they will also have learned to use their
minds well, so they may be prepared for responsible citizenship, further
learning, and productive employment in our· modern economy; (4) U.S.
students will be firSt in the world in science and mathematics achievement; (5) Every adult American will be literate and will possess the
knowledge and skills necessary to compete in a global economy and to
exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship; and (6) Every school
in America will be free of drugs and violence and will offer a disciplined
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summit recognized that education is central to our quality of
life.2 Yet, concerns about the effectiveness of the public educational system continue to surface. An educational system where
students are functionally illiterate upon completion of available
programs suggests serious flaws in that system.
The success of American society is dependent on the quality of education. Those attending the summit recognized that
education "is at the heart of our economic strength and security, our creativity in the arts and letters, our invention in the
sciences, and the perpetuation of our cultural values. Education
is the key to America's international competitiveness."3 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education4 stated that "[t]oday, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments."5 Education
not only prepares students for professional training but builds
a foundation for good citizenship. 6
Despite this recognition of education's importance, to both
students and society, some public schools fail to instill necessary skills for productivity in a contemporary society. Consequently, the goals set forth at the Education Summit demand
"[s]weeping, fundamental changes in our education system ...."7 These changes must come not just from educators
and students, but from all Americans; 8 communities, business
and civic groups, and state, local, and federal government each
play a vital role in ensuring the success of our public education
system. 9
The courts may play an important role in effectuating the
changes necessary to attain these National Goals. 10 Restructuring education requires creating powerful incentives for
teacher performance and improvement, and real consequences

environment conducive to learning.

I d.
2.

3.

Id. at 1.
Id.
347

4.
u.s. 483 (1954).
5.
Id. at 493. The Supreme Court indicated that great expenditures for education and compulsory school attendance laws demonstrate the government's recognition of the importance of education.
6.
Id.; see also National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 2-4 (reference
made in Introduction, in Goal 3, and in Goal 5).
7.
National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 1.
8.
Id.
9.
Id. at 1-2.
National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 3-5.
10.
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for persistent failure. 11 The exact role courts must play in creating incentives or consequences has not been established.
Many commentators have urged courts to recognize the tort of
educational malpractice. 12

II.

EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE

"Educational malpractice" is the failure to adequately educate a student; it includes the improper or inadequate instruction, testing, placement or counseling of a child. 13 Educational
malpractice claims can be divided into two distinct categories:
(1) failure to provide an adequate education, and (2) misclassification and improper placement within the school system. 14 As
Id. at 7.
See Kimberly A. Wilkins, Note, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action
in Need of a Call for Action, 22 VAI... U. L. REv. 427 (1988) (proposes that the
11.
12.

theory of recovery grounded in negligence can be utilized. It also proposes a
standard of care to aid in judicial assessment of educational malpractice complaints
through legislative recognition of such a cause of action); Destin S. Tracy, Comment, Educational Negligence: A Student's GaUBe of Action for Incompetent Academic InBtruction, 58 N.C.L. REV. 561 (1980) (urging judicial recognition of a cause of
action for educational negligence that is limited in scope to protect both educators
and society); Alice J. Klein, Note, Educational Malpractice: Can the Judiciary
Remedy the Growing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 27
(1979) [hereinafter Note, SUFFOLK U. L. REV.] (In the absence of self-instituted
review and in an effort to stimulate educational improvements, the judiciary should
require account;ability for failings that educators could have prevented); Case
Comment, Belle L. Gordon, Schools and School Districts--Doe v. San Francisco
United School District, Tort Liability for Failure to Educate, 6 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
462 (1975) (urging that the court's ruling in Doe v. San Francisco United School
District will perpetuate the status quo and encourage the ignoring of existing
educational requirements); John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational
Harms CaUBed by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1978)
(analyzing the general policy considerations underlying court reluctance to make
decisions concerning educational policies); Robert H. Jerry, II., Recovery in Tort for
Educational Malpractice: Problems of Theory and Policy, 29 U. KAN. L. REv. 195
(1981) [hereinafter Jerry] (arguing that the refusal to recognize a cause of action
for educational malpractice is incompatible with accepted tort principles); Joan
Blackburn, Comment, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 117 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, FORDHAM URB. L.J.] (addressing the
alternative theories which form a basis of a suit for educational malpractice and
suggesting that an action for negligent misrepresentation may be the best theory
for establishing liability); Nancy L. Woods, Note, Educational Malfeasance: A New
GaUBe of Action for Failure to Educate?, 14 TULsA L.J. 383 (1978) (considering the
feasibility of educational malpractice in light of educational accountability and
competency-based education movements in some states); Comment, Educational
Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1976) (arguing that negligence suits with a
comparative standard of care stand the most chance of success).
13.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AI..., PRosSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS §
131 (5th ed. 1984).
14.
The scope of this note is limited to the first category, failure to provide an
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of yet, no court has recognized a cause of action for failure to
provide an adequate education. 15 While there are a variety of
theories upon which recovery may be based, 16 the most popuadequate education. It has been argued by several commentators that claims in the
second category should not be labeled as true "educational malpractice" actions. See
Richard Funston, Education Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Search of a Theory,
18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 743, 758 (1981) [hereinafter Funston]; Edward J. Wallison,
Jr., Note, Nonliability for Negligence in the Public SchoolB-•Educational Malpractice• From Peter W. to Hoffman, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 814 (1980) (arguing that
Hoffman v. Board of Ed. of City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376
(1979), was incorrectly labeled as an educational malpractice action).
One court has recognized a cause of action for misplacement of a student in
special education-not based on failure to educate a student in basic academic
skills. B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982). In B.M., it was alleged that the
child was misplaced in a segregated special education program. However, the court
based its acknowledgment of the cause of action on statutory and Office of Public
Instruction requirements alone. Id. at 427.
15.
See Poe v. Hamilton, 565 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Rich v. Kentucky Country Day, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (against a private
school); Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 762 P.2d 356 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988);
Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 744 P.2d 919 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Armstrong
v. Data Processing Inst., Inc., 509 So.2d 1298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); DeRosa v.
City of New York, 517 N.Y.S.2d 754 (App. Div. 1987); Agostine v. Sch. Dist., 527
A.2d 193 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987); Denson v. Steubenville Bd. of Educ., No. 85-J-31,
1986 WL 8239 (Ohio Ct. App. July 29, 1986); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108
(Iowa 1986); Cavello v. Sherburne-Earlville Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 N.Y.S.2d 466
(App. Div. 1985); Myers v. Medford Lakes Bd. of Educ., 489 A.2d 1240 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1985); Swidryk v. Saint Michael's Medical Ctr., 493 A.2d 641 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985); Torres v. Little Flower Children's Serv., 474 N.E.2d 223
(N.Y. 1984); Village Community Sch. v. Adler, 478 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Civ. Ct. 1984);
Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 453 A.2d 814 (Md. 1982); Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454
N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div. 1982) (action against a private school); Tubell v. Dade
County Pub. Sch., 419 So.2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Hunter v. Bd. of
Educ., 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982); Aubrey v. Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1306 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1981); Washington v. City of New York, 442 N.Y.S.2d 20 (App. Div. 1981);
D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981);
Helm v. Professional Children's Sch., 431 N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 1980); Hoffman
v. Bd. of Ed., 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch.
Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
16.
Other theories of recovery include notions of contract law, misrepresentation, and constitutional grounds. See Comment, FORDHAM URB. L.J., supra note 12
(misrepresentation); Charles M. Masner, Note, The ABC's of Duty: Educational
Malpractice and the Functionally Illiterate Student, 8 GoLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 293
(1978) (contract); Note, Educational Malpractice and the Right to Education: Should
Compulsory Education Laws Require a Quid Pro Quo?, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 555
(1982) (constitutional grounds).
Also, some of these theories have been advanced in the case law. In Peter W.,
the theories of misrepresentation and negligence were the basis of the claim for
relief. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). In Donohue, the claim was based on the theories of
negligence and constitutional grounds. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist.
47 N.Y.2d 440, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979). B.M.'s alleged cause of action included
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lar theory lies in the tort principles of negligence. 17
Traditionally, a person alleging a cause of action for negligence must prove four basic and necessary elements: duty,
breach of duty, causal connection, and injury. First, the law
must recognize a duty requiring the defendant's conduct to
conform to certain standards (standard of care) to protect others against unreasonable risks. Second, that duty must be
breached by the defendant. Third, there must be a reasonably
close causal connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury to the plaintiff. Fourth, actual loss or damage to the
plaintiff must be demonstrated. 18

A.

Duty Owed

Courts have refused to recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice because of the absence of a workable standard of care. 19 The court in Peter W. v. Sari Francisco Unified
School District held that no workable standard of care exists to
measure an educator's teaching methods. It explained that the
science of pedagogy promotes a multitude of conflicting views
and approaches to educating students, and determining the
"correct" method would be an impossible task. 20

1.

Standard of care for the "Professional Educator"

Although commentators have urged the courts to adopt a
"workable" standard of care, the courts have been unable to
find such a standard. 21 Because the National Goals for Education emphasize placing more responsibility on educators, courts
may be compelled to accept the standard of care set forth for
professionals. This standard of care requires that professionals
possess and use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily employed by members of that particular profession in good standing.22 Courts have applied this professional standard of care
to cases involving doctors, 23 dentists, 24 pharmacists, 25 psychiclaims for negligent and constitutional violations. B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 649
P.2d 425 (1982).
17.
See JeJTY, supra note 12 (for a list of educational malpractice cases based
on negligence).
18.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 30.
19.
See Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
20.
!d.
21.
!d. at 861.
22.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 32.
23.
See, e.g., Shumaker v. Johnson, 571 So.2d 991 (Ala. 1990); Battles v.
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atrists, 26 veterinarians, 27 lawyers, 26 architects and engineers,29 accountants, 80 abstractors of title, 81 chiropractors, 82 karate teachers, 88 pilots, 84 and nurses. 85 The court
in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District suggested
that "[i]f doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers and other professionals are charged with a duty owing to the public whom
they serve, it could be said that nothing in the law precludes
similar treatment of professional educators."86 In fact, the National Goals for Education refer several times to educators as
"professionals. "87 At present, however, the majority of courts
have held educators to a lesser, quasi-professional standard. 88

Aderhold, 430 So.2d 307 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Walls v. Boyett, 226 S.W.2d 552
(Ark. 1950); Hill v. Boughton, 1 So.2d 610 (Fla. 1941); DeLaughter v. Womack, 164
So.2d 762 (Miss. 1964).
Capps v. Manhart, 458 N.W.2d 742 (Neb. 1990); Elliott v. Owen, 393 S.E.2d
24.
347 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (orthodontist); Willard v. Hagemeister, 175 Cal. Rptr. 365
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Rice v. Jaskolski, 313 N.W.2d 893 (Mich. 1981).
25.
Koderick v. Snyder Brothers Drug, Inc., 413 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); French Drug Co. v.
Jones, 367 So.2d 431 (Miss. 1978).
26.
Ray v. Ameri·Care Hosp., 400 So.2d 1127 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Cotton v.
Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
27.
Barlett v. MacRae, 635 P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); Ruden v. Hansen, 206
N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1973); Posnien v. Rogers, 533 P.2d 120 (Utah 1975).
See, e.g., Meller v. Bartlett, 580 A.2d 484 (Vt. 1990); Mali v. Odom, 367
28.
S.E.2d 166 (S.C. 1988); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 So.2d 239
(La. 1972); Caltrider v. Weant, 128 A. 72 (Md. 1925).
29.
Robinson Redevelopment Co. v. Anderson, 547 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div.
1989); Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 325 A.2d 432 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974); City
of Eveleth v. Ruble, 225 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1974).
30.
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990);
Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248
N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308
(N.H. 1982).
31.
Razete v. Preferred Research, Inc., 397 S.E.2d 489 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990);
Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
32.
Ammon v. Carpenter, 252 Cal. Rptr. 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Chamness v.
Odum, 399 N.E.2d 238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
33.
Fantini v. Alexander, 410 A.2d 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
34.
35.
Gasbarra v. St. James Hasp., 406 N.E.2d 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (defendant
hospital and hospital nurses); Bambert v. Central Gen. Hasp., 430 N.Y.S.2d 336
(App. Div. 1980).
36.
Donohue, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
37.
National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 1, 7.
38.
Jay M. Pabian, Note, Educational Malpractice and Minimal Competency Testing: Is There a Legal Remedy at Last?, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 101, 127 (1979). The
defmition of a professional often excludes education. W. MOORE, THE PRoFESSIONS
5-6 (1970) (professional preparation involves rigorous education). Public school
teachers are described by the author as members of an aspiring semi-professional
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Some commentators argue that educators should be held to
the same standard applied to other professionals in light of
educators' numerous responsibilities. These responsibilities
include selecting materials to carry out mandatory curriculum
objectives, establishing standards of performance, organizing
instruction along with selecting appropriate instructional techniques, and measuring and evaluating the accomplishments of
students. 39 One of the objectives of the National Goals for
Education is to give educators (principals and teachers) the
discretion to make more decisions. This would provide educators with greater flexibility to innovate new methods of teaching, to use resources in more productive ways, and to provide
alternate entrance paths for gifted professionals who wish to
teach. 40 With increased flexibility, the educator's responsibility toward his pupils would be enhanced, requiring the heightened status of "professional."
However, there are several practical reasons for differentiating educators from other recognized professionals such as
doctors and lawyers. First, an educator is a public servant who
receives his salary from the community budget. 41 The salary
schedule of teachers reflects only their level of education and
experience, rather than their reputation or status. 42 Parental
recognition of an educator's ability or excellence will generally
not affect the educator's salary. Second, clients exercise significant control over the hiring and flriiig of professionals such as
lawyers and doctors. 43 Students and parents, however, exercise only a limited amount of control over educators. Parents
normally do not perceive teachers as their employees.44
Until a "workable" standard of care is determined to be
applicable to educators, the courts will continue to deny educational malpractice claims.

occupation. Id. at 73.
V. Hodges & W. Johnson, Legal Responsibility for Curriculum in the Basic
39.
Skills: Whose Job Is It?, Colorado State Univ. (Mar. 1981) (paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Regional Conference of the Colorado Language Arts Society
(Colorado Springs, Colo., Mar. 13-15, 1981)).
40.
National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 7.
41.
Note, SUFFOLK U. L. REV., supra note 12, at 42.
42.
Comment, Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 627, 631-32 (1973)
(professionals rely primarily on reputation and status to determine earning capacity).
43.
Note, SUFFOLK U. L. REV., supra note 12, at 42.
44.
Hentoff, Who's to Blame? The Politics of Educational Malpractice, 6
LEARNING 40, 43 (Oct. 1977).
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2. Policy considerations against the recognition of a duty
Applying a standard of care to educators is not without its
problems. The recognition of a duty is "the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. "45 For example in
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, the court
relied on public policy considerations for not recognizing a
duty. 46
The recognition of a duty to adequately educate would
expose educators to countless claims, real or imagined. This
burden would cost society not only time and money, 47 but also
prospective instructors. The drafters of the National Goals for
Education recognize that the key to the restructuring of our
nation's public education system is the capability to attract and
keep quality teachers who have educational skills and knowledge of up-to-date technology. 48 The recognition of educational
malpractice claims would require administrators to tighten the
policies on hiring and certification of potential educators. Yet,
the National Goals of Education encourage adoption of policies
to attract more qualified teachers from diverse backgrounds. 49
The court in Donohue argued that an educational malpractice claim would constitute unwarranted judicial intrusion not
only into broad educational policies, but more importantly, into
the day-to-day implementation of such policies. 50 Such an intrusion is contrary to the need to allow greater flexibility for educators to innovate new ways to improve learning. 51 The desire
for increased flexibility, 52 coupled with the inherently impre-

45.
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976) (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)).
46.
Id. at 861. The court stated, "These recognized policy considerations alone
negate an actionable 'duty of care' in persons and agencies who administer the
academic phases of the public educational process."
47.
Id.
48.
National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 7.
49.
Id.
50.
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y.
1979).
National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 7.
51.
52.
The court in Peter W. stated that "[t]he science of pedagogy . . . is fraught
with different and conflicting theories of how or what a child should be taught,
and any layman might-and commonly does-have his own emphatic views on the
subject." Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860·61
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
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cise nature of education, conflicts with the rigidity and absolute
nature of court made rules. Therefore, the courts have resisted
applying a single standard of care to educators in light of the
host of variable factors which influence the process of education.68

B. Remaining Elements of Negligence
Even if a plaintiff is able to establish a workable standard
of care he must still satisfy the remaining three elements of
negligence: breach of duty, causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the resulting injury to plaintiff, and
actual loss or damage to plaintiff.

1. Breach of duty
Assuming a professional standard of care applies, the
plaintiff must establish that the defendant failed to use known
and available educational alternatives. 54 This proof must be
established by an "expert witness," someone who is an expert
in the profession, such as a teacher or administrator. 55 However, problems would arise since even educators disagree on
what philosophies and methods of education are most appropriate. 56 The choice between various methods of education depends on a myriad of factors. 57 Therefore, expert witnesses
could most certainly be located to support each side of the case.
Also, due to the different approaches taken by the various districts and states, the "locality rule", which requires that the
expert witness be an authority in the same geographic location
as the defendant, would seem to be necessary. 58 However,
some jurisdictions have discarded the locality rule altogether

53.
Id. at 861.
54.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 32.
55.
Id. at 188 (to prevail in a malpractice case the plaintiff must establish
through expert testimony both the standard of care and the fact that the
defendant's conduct did not measure up to that standard); see, e.g., Campbell v.
Palmer, 568 A.2d 1064, 1067 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (testimony of expert is necessary to establish both standard of proper professional skill or care on the part of
physician and that defendant failed to conform to that standard of care).
56.
Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
57.
Id. One such factor is the recognition that there are two duties involved in
malpractice cases. There is the duty of the educator to teach which is coupled with
a duty to learn on the part of the student. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch.
Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (App. Div.), affd 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
58.
Deborah D. Dye, Note, Educational Malp1Tl£tice: A Cause of Action that
Failed to Pass the Test, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 499, 506 (1987).
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having noticed that, in medical malpractice suits, physicians
from the same area are reluctant to testify against a colleague.69 There is no reason to believe that an educator would
be less reluctant to testify against another educator.
To further complicate the finding of a breach of duty, the
National Goals for Education have stressed the desire to give
educators greater flexibility to serve the needs of a diverse body
of students. 60 The potential of subjecting an educator's unproven methods to laymen Gudges and juries) and experts who
have different theories of education may stifle innovation and
creativity. Therefore, the questions remain: are courts in any
position to determine "the correct way" to educate, and when
has an educator breached his duty to educate?

2.

Causal connection between conduct and injury

The plaintiff must also prove that the educator's breach of
duty was a factual and proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries.
The defendant's conduct is considered the factual cause of the
injury if (1) the event would not have occurred but for the
defendant's conduct ("but for" test), and (2) defendant's conduct
is more than an insignificant contribution to the result ("substantial-factor" test). 61 Factual causation is very difficult, if
not impossible, to prove due to a multitude of factors such as
the student's motivation, attitude, temperament, and past experience, along with other mental, social and economic factors.62
Proximate cause deals with how far courts will extend
liability. A defendant's conduct is the proximate cause if it is so
closely connected with the result, and of such significance, that
the law is justified in imposing liability. 63 Proving proximate
causation is complicated by the multitude of factors outside the
educator's control which influence a students inability to

59.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 32 (some jurisdictions have replaced the
"locality rule" with a general national standard, especially in the case of medical specialists); see, e.g., Paintiff v. Parkersburg, 345 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1986) (West Virginia
no longer applies the locality rule in medical malpractice suits because physicians
from the same area are reluctant to testify against a colleague).
National Goals for Education, supra note 1, at 1, 7.
60.
61.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 41.
62.
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353-55 (N.Y.
1979) See also, Funston, supra note 14, at 784-90 (causation is the greatest impediment in "educational malpractice" suits).
63.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 41.
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learn. 64 Clearly, the act of one particular teacher in a school
system cannot cause a student to graduate from high school
functionally illiterate. As an Alaskan court explained, the level
of learning that a child might have reached if an educator had
not breached his duty is impossible to assess; therefore, the
determination of proximate cause is beyond the court's ability.65

3. Injury
The final element necessary for the tort of negligence is
actual loss or damage suffered by the plaintiff. As stated in
Donohue, "who can in good faith deny that a student who upon
graduation from high school cannot comprehend simple
English-a deficiency allegedly attributable to the negligence of
his educators-has not in some fashion been 'injured'.»>O However, some courts have refused to recognize injury resulting
from a failure to educate as an "injury" within the meaning of
tort law. 67
Court recognition of educational deficiency as tort injury
creates two basic problems.68 First, the plaintiff has lost what
amounts to an expectancy interest or a failure to receive a
benefit.69 The issue of not receiving an adequate education is
analogous to the issue resolved in H.R. Moch Co., Inc. u.
Rensselaer Water Co., where the court held that a municipal
contractor's failure to furnish sufficient water to adequately
fight fires was a denial of a benefit, not a commission of a legal
wrong. 70 What was lost was an expectancy interest, for which
the court does not recognize a right of redress. Likewise, in an
educational malpractice suit the injury to the plaintiff is the
lost expectancy interest.
Second, the calculation of damages for non-learning would
be virtually impossible. 71 Damages would be based on future
earnings which are mere expectations and are highly specula-
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tive. In one case, Sioux Indian children were denied recovery
for lost educational benefits because the amount of the loss
could not be determined with sufficient accuracy. 72 Education
up to a particular level does not guarantee a particular income, 78 and damages resulting from a lack of education are
difficult to assess. Therefore, the task of proving actual injury
continues to be an obstacle for those who advocate recognition
of educational malpractice as a legal cause of action.

III.

CONCLUSION

Many policy considerations are at the center of a court's
decision of whether to recognize a claim for educational malpractice. 74 The National Goals for Education encourage restructuring of the public education system to make teachers
and administrators more accountable. However, in light of the
many other aspirations set forth in the National Goals of Education, this plea for increased accountability must be balanced
with the need for greater flexibility. The courts have been unable to adequately balance these seemingly contradictory needs.
Judicial recognition of a cause of action for "educational
malpractice" would burden an already inadequate education
system. Holding educators accountable for their actions is desirable. Deciding the extent and enforcement of standards to
increase accountability should not be left to the courts. These
issues are largely political and are properly left to the legislative process. The hoped for improvements sought by the National Goals for Education require all Americans to take part in
the restructuring of the public education system. 76 All parties-students, parents, educators, and legislators-need to
take concrete steps to police and improve public education. If
society does not take steps to restructure the faltering public
school system, it runs the risk that the courts, with all the
undesirable consequences accompanying such an action, may
decide for us.

Russell K. Smith
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